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Record identifier : 564695
Personal Name - Primary Intelectual Responsibility : Amini Bayat, Mahdieh
Title and statement of responsibility : Design of an Optimal Bonus-Malus System for Iran Automobile Collison Insurance Market [Thesis]/امینی بیات، مهدیه;supervisor: Farhad Khorrami;advisor: Ghadir Mahdavi
Publication, Distribution,Etc. : , 2009
Language of the Item : eng
Internal Bibliographies/Indexes Note : bibliography
Dissertation of thesis details and type of degree : Master of Arts
Body granting the degree : , E.C.O. College of Insurance
Summary or Abstract : هدف تحقیق: طراحی یک سیستم تخفیف - جریمه بهینه برای بیمه بدنه اتومبیل در ایران است. روش تحقیق: کتابخانه‌ای. یافته های تحقیق: نشان می دهند که انتخاب توزیع پواسن آمیخته برای فراوانی تصادفات و توزیعهایی نمایی و لاگ نرکال برای شدت تصادفات قابل قبول است و همچنینی سیستمهای تخفیف - جریمه با فرانشیزهای متغیر روشی کارا برای تصحیحی حق بیمه دریافتی توسط شرکتهای بیمه می باشد
: In automobile insurance the priori classification is done looking at the policyholders' characteristics, such as age, gender and marriage position and their automobile characteristics, such as type, age and use of automobile. According to the priori ratemaking, the policyholders who look like bad drivers are charged higher premium even when they are good drivers in reality and vice versa. In fact, there are always many important factors that although they affect arising losses, they can not be taken into account in the priori risk classification. Think for instance of drinking habit, swiftness of reflexes, aggressiveness at the wheel and knowledge of the Highway Code. The Bonus-Malus Systems, as the adjusting method, penalize the policyholders with one or more claims by premium surcharges (Maluses) and reward the claim-free policyholders by premium discounts (Bonuses). By using the Bonus-Malus Systems two results are achieved: 1. The policyholders who are really bad drivers have to pay more premium in the long run. 2. The policyholders are motivated to drive carefully in order to make no claims. There are several models for Bonus-Malus Systems that are mostly based on the number of claims. These systems suffer from Bonus-Hunger Problem that will be discussed latter. However, among all, we have selected the Bonus-Malus System with Varying Deductibles because it counts the size of claims via deductibles. This approach has been introduced by Pitrebois et al. (2005) [19] and extended by Denuit et al. (2007) [4]. According to this model the premium surcharges in Malus zones could be replaced partially or completely by deductibles that vary based on the level equipped by the policyholders. This thesis includes two general parts. First part discusses the theoretical foundations of the research and the second part applies them to Iranian data. You can see different models of the BMS and comparison of them in the first part, in addition to the statistical approaches for finding the claim frequencies and severities distributions. In the second part, using the automobile collision insurance data obtained from Karafarin Insurance Company, we try to come up with a Bonus-Malus System mixing with deductibles for Iran..
Topical Name Used as Subject : Bonus-Malus system
: Transitiation rule
: Statiribution
: Varying
Information of biblio record : TL
 
 
 
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