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Record identifier : 564789
Personal Name - Primary Intelectual Responsibility : Rostamian, Maryam
Title and statement of responsibility : Tests for the Presence of Moral Hazard in Iranian Car Insurance Market (The case of Iran Insurance Company) [Thesis]/رستمیان، مریم;supervisor: Ghadir Mahdavi;advisor: Reza Ofoghi
Publication, Distribution,Etc. : , 2010
Language of the Item : eng
Internal Bibliographies/Indexes Note : Bibliography
Dissertation of thesis details and type of degree : Master of Arts
Discipline of degree : , Actuarial science
Body granting the degree : , E.C.O. College of Insurance
Summary or Abstract : هدف تحقیق: بررسی آزمون وجود مخاطره اخلاقی در بازار بیمه اتومبیل ایران ( مطالعه موردی شرکت بیمه ایران ) است. طبق یافته های تحقیق فرض عدم وجود مخاطره در بازار بیمه اتومبیل ایران رد می شود به عبارتی دیگر بیمه گذرانی که ماشین های کم قیمت تری دارند بیشتر بیمه بدند اتومبیل خریداری می کنند
: Moral hazard refers to the effect of insurance coverages to alter an individual's motive to prevent loss. This influences expenses for the insurer and the cost of coverage for individuals. Moral hazard arises when people behave in ways to satisfy themselves, but because they don't bear the full cost; their behavior comes at the detriment of others. For example, if the contents of our car are fully insured against theft, we will be less diligent in locking it up and taking other precautions against theft. Moral hazard is special case asymmetric information, a situation in which one party in a transaction has more information than another. The party that is insulated from risk generally has more information about its actions and intentions than the party paying for the negative consequences of the risk. Coinsurance and deductibles reduce the risk of moral hazard by increasing the out of- pocket spending of consumers, which decreases their incentive to consume. Thus, the insured has a financial incentive to avoid making a claim. Beginning with Arrow (1963) and pauly (1968), economists have discussed two partial solutions to the problem of moral hazard: i) Incomplete coverage against loss ii) "Observation" by the insurer of the care taken to prevent loss. We test for the presence of moral hazard in the car insurance market utilizing the Iranian car insurance data sets. Mainly, we investigate whether the number of policyholders who has a low valued car is quite small in the purchase of collision insurance. For this purpose, in our sample, we use the data of those who purchased two types of coverage and those who purchase only third party insurance. Then, we want to see whether the number of people in the first group is substantially small for low valued cars. If the percentage of first group (who purchased both types) is relatively high-with respect to these who only purchase third party insurance among owners of low - valued cars, we can conclude there may exist moral hazard in automobile insurance market. This study question which variables influence on moral hazard and basic hypothesis is that moral hazard exists in Iranian automobile insurance market. We expect that policyholders of low- value cars choose only third party insurance if there is no moral hazard.
Topical Name Used as Subject : MOral Hazard
: Asymmetric Information
: Collision Insurance
: Quantiles
: Nonparmetric Analysis
Information of biblio record : TL
 
 
 
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