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Record identifier : 564824
Personal Name - Primary Intelectual Responsibility : Izadi Dastgerdi,Zahra
Title and statement of responsibility : Evidence of adverse selection in Iran's supplementary health insurance market [Thesis];supervisor: Ghadir Mahdavi;advisor: Jamshid Amanee
Publication, Distribution,Etc. : , 2010
Language of the Item : eng
Internal Bibliographies/Indexes Note : Bibligraphy
Dissertation of thesis details and type of degree : Master of Arts
Discipline of degree : , Acthuarial science
Body granting the degree : , E.C.O collage
Summary or Abstract : اهمیت موضوع و هدف: یکی از نگرانیهای بیمه گران وجود اطلاعات نامتقارن در بازار بیمه می باشد زیرا در این چنین وضعیتی خسارت های ایجاد شده توسط بیمه شده ها بیشتر از نرخ میانگین کل خسارتی می باشد که برای تعیین میزان حق بیمه استفاده می شود.یافته های تحقیق نشان می دهندکه ضریب همبستگی مثبت بین تقاضای بیمه درمان تکمیلی و ایجاد خسارت وجود دارد.نتیجه گیری: بررسی وجود انتخاب نامساعد در دیگر بازارهای بیمه اختیاری.بررسی وجود مخاطرات اخلاقی به عنوان منبع ایجاد ضریب همبستگی مثبت
: Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) introduced existence of information asymmetry in the insurance sector. Asymmetric information occurs in insurance market when the policyholder is assumed to know more about her (his) risk level to insurers. Two main consequences of asymmetric information problems were introduced by Arrow (1963), as moral hazard and adverse selection. Existence of adverse selection problem in insurance market is one of the important cases that have always been considered by insurers. Two types of individuals are assumed in insurance market, low risk individuals and high risk individuals. Based on this assumption, adverse selection theory states that high risk individuals demand the insurance service more than low risk individuals. The adverse selection problem leads to increase in premium which leads to exiting of low risk individuals. Thus, adverse selection problem faces insurance company with situation that policyholders claim losses which are higher than the average rate of loss of population. There are many important factors that they affect arising losses. It seems that policyholdersب characteristics, such as age, gender, education level, marital status and occupation type are effective factors in their risk level. Obviously, supplementary health insurance is one of the main branches of insurance. This insurance provides coverage for medicine, visits to the doctor or emergency room, hospitalization, medical examinations and other medical expenses. Existence and development of supplementary health insurance is very important in each insurance industry. Using collected data from questionnaires among practitioner individuals, the presence of adverse selection problem in Iranبs supplementary health insurance market is tested. Two logistic regression models are estimated in order to determine the effect of individualبs characteristics on decision to purchase supplementary health insurance coverage and loss occurrence. This research will use the correlation between claim occurrence and decision to purchase supplementary health insurance to test the existence of adverse selection in health insurance market. If there is a statistically significant positive correlation between them then existence of adverse selection is confirmed in this market. Since there is positive correlation between loss occurrence and decision to purchase supplementary health insurance coverage, the hypothesis of existence of adverse selection in Iranian supplementary health insurance is accepted..
Topical Name Used as Subject : Asymmettric information
: Adverse selection
: logistic regeression
Information of biblio record : TL
 
 
 
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