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" Test for Evidence of Adverse Selection In Iranian Automobile Insurance Market "
Maryam Masihpour
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565197
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| Personal Name - Primary Intelectual Responsibility
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Masihpour, Maryam
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| Title and statement of responsibility
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Test for Evidence of Adverse Selection In Iranian Automobile Insurance Market [Thesis]Maryam Masihpour;supervisor: Ghadir Mahdavi;advisor: Atousa Godarzi
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| Publication, Distribution,Etc.
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, 2013
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eng
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English
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Bibliography
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| Dissertation of thesis details and type of degree
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MA
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| Discipline of degree
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, Actuarial Science
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| Body granting the degree
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ECO College of Insurance
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| Summary or Abstract
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.هدف : وجود انتخاب نامناسب یک مسئله اساسی دربازار بیمه می باشد .به دلیل وجود انتخاب نامناسب در بازار بیمه که مستلزم اعمال هزینه های اضافی در نرخ گذاری می باشد ، برای اکچوئر اثبات وجود انتخاب نامناسب یا انتخاب مناسب از اهمییت ویژه ای برخوردار است. .بنابراین مشخص کردن رژیم در نرخ گذاری در بازار بیمه بسیار مهم است .یافته های تحقیق :یافته های تحقیق نشان می دهد همبستگی مثبت بین وقوع تصادف و انتخاب پوشش های اضافی در بیمه بدنه اتومبیل وجود دارد که با داشتن این همبستگی مثبت وجود انتخاب نامناسب در بازاربیمه اتومبیل ایران اثبات می شود
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Existence of adverse selection in insurance market is one of the controversial cases that have always been considered by insurers.In this thesis, we evaluate that individual riskiness influences the choice of coverage and the occurrence of accidents, which gives the opportunity to state about the evidence of adverse selection problem in the automobile insurance market. A statistically significant positive correlation between these two variables confirms existence of adverse selection in Iranian automobile insurance market. Because of existing positive correlation, we conclude that Iranian automobile insurance market is affected by adverse selection..
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Collision insurance
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Asymmetric information
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collision insurance
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Asymmetric information
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Adverse selection
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Moral hazard
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TL
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| Material Type
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Latin Dissertation
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