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" Inferential-role semantics: A theory of concepts for philosophy and psychology "
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565589
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| Personal Name - Primary Intelectual Responsibility
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Cowley, Joshua D
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| Title and statement of responsibility
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Inferential-role semantics: A theory of concepts for philosophy and psychology [Thesis]
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The University of Arizona, 2004
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eng
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Ph.D.
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| Body granting the degree
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, The University of Arizona
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| Summary or Abstract
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Concepts are not sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. This fact has caused trouble for both psychologists and philosophers. The resultant psychological theories of concepts, which are primarily aimed at the functional role of concepts, are very specific but this specificity is at the expense of excluding some types of concepts. The resultant philosophical theories of concepts, which are primarily aimed at the content of concepts, are general but this generality is at the expense of understanding the role concepts play in the mind..
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Philosophy, Cognitive therapy
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TL
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Latin Dissertation
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